Análise crítica do modelo de mensuração variável proposto pelo método do EVA®

Abstract

This study's objective is to realize a critical analysis of the EVA® Variable Remuneration Program, beginning from it's theoretical conception and culminating to the definition and critical analysis of the inherent requisites of the analyzed variable remuneration programs in contrast with the identified requisites in the EVA® Variable Remuneration Program. The EVA® model shows it's variable remuneration program as a mechanism with the capacity of making managers to think and behave as the company's owners, based on the allegation that the bigger the EVA the bigger the manager's bonus, and the bigger the wealth created to the shareholder. However, this affirmation will be questioned by this dissertation. The research identified that the behavior and the satisfaction of the companies' employers are not just tied to the financial questions, but they are also connected to a variety of elements with the capacity of forming a motivated working environment. It was verified in this dissertation that the EVA® Variable Remuneration Program partly attends the inherent requisites of the variable remuneration programs.