Análise sobre a relação entre Underpricing e lock-up dos ipos no mercado brasileiro: uma abordagem alternativa envolvendo o período de lockup

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between the underpricing of IPOs and the sale of shares by the company's managers in the period after lock-up in the brazilian market between 2004 and 2019. The literature points out that the reasons that cause underpricing are linked to information asymmetry, through more informed underwriters or investors. An alternative approach studying american offers between 1994 and 1999 shows that company managers do not sell their shares within the scope of the offer, but wait for the end of the lock-up period to sell and maximize earnings, intentionally causing the underpricing and waiting for the market to adjust expectations positively about the stock and value its price. This work seeks to test and apply this hypothesis to the brazilian market with the necessary adaptations. The results suggest that in the brazilian market, underpricing is not intentionally caused by company managers by retaining their positions, but presents evidence that managers are related to the existence of underpricing when their positions are diluted and consequent loss of shareholder control, selling shares in the period after the lock-up.