Tributos ou lucro? O acionista governo e a agressividade tributária no Brasil

Abstract

Tax aggressiveness has never been the subject of so much discussion as it is currently, as taxes are dividends to the State and a cost to shareholders of companies in general. This discussion aroused curiosity considering when the shareholder is the Government itself. Could it be considered tax aggressiveness when the shareholder is the Government itself, which already receives its dividend in addition to the tax itself in its box? We examine the presence of tax aggressiveness in the calculation and collection of taxes on profits, when we have the Government as a shareholder, whether in the direct or indirect administration of the Union, States, Federal District and Municipalities. Brazilian Companies listed on B3 (Brazil, Bolsa Balcão) were observed in the years 2010 to 2020. The population included all institutions, except financial and insurance companies. The indices Cash ETR (proxy to measure long-term tax aggressiveness), Current ETR (current effective tax rate measured by current tax expense per monetary unit of accounting profit), BTD Total (Profit before income tax and CSLL) were analyzed deducted from total current taxes divided by the sum of tax rates on income), ROA (Return on Assets – operating income divided by assets of the previous year) and LEV (Leverage – Long-term debt divided by assets of the previous year). The confirmed hypothesis is that the tax aggressiveness of a company, which has a government shareholder, is lower compared to when there is no government shareholder, so this hypothesis was not rejected. Our results suggest a lower tax aggressiveness on the part of state-owned companies in relation to non-state companies.