Remuneração do executivo vinculada a objetivos de longo prazo e a geração de valor ao acionista

Abstract

It has been a challenge for companies and scholars the issue of alignment of interest between owners and executives, called agency problems. Among its various views and administrative tools, created with the purpose of mitigating these problems the salary of the executive which can be a tool of encouragement when it is compensated in a variable way linked to purposes which set challenges to add value to the companies and thus a higher return to stockholders. There are claims in this context that the remuneration models which determine long-term goals are more appropriate, once they enable measure tangible results for organizations. Thereforeaim of this study was to investigate the relationship between the presence of variable remuneration linked to long-term goals and business performance as well as the behavior of that financial performance by business sector. One hundred fifty-fivepublicly traded companies were analyzed in 2010, which information has been extracted from References Forms (FR). The indicators used were Enterprise Value, EBITDA and Total Return to Shareholders (TRS), constructed with data provided by the Economática System, for the period from 2010 to 2013. The significance of variables was tested using the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and the figure which was carried out showed statistical significance the impact on the type of remuneration on the financial performance of the sample only for the indicator Enterprise Value, the results suggested that the long-term goal linked to the remuneration can positively influence the company's performance.